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Ralston v. Robinson: Changing A Youth
Corrections Act Sentence in Midstream
I. Introduction
The Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA)1 provides for the
special treatment of convicted youth offenders whom the sen-
tencing judge considers to be capable of rehabilitation into pro-
ductive citizens.2 The objectives of the YCA are furthered by
segregating the youth offenders from the adult offenders and by
providing them with educational and vocational training,$ rather
than merely giving them standard adult sentences. But, when a
youth offender sentenced under the YCA commits further
crimes, and shows little response to the special treatment under
the YCA, the sentencing judge for the subsequent crime is faced
with a dilemma. Although the youth offender has demonstrated
that the YCA treatment is of "no benefit" to him, the first sen-
tencing judge saw potential for improvement, and the prescribed
YCA treatment leaves little room for modification by statute.4
Circuits have split over the power of the second sentencing judge
to modify the originally imposed YCA sentence under such cir-
cumstances.5 The United States Supreme Court, in Ralston v.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976). See infra notes 9, 11, 52, 53, 56, 64, & 65 for the
texts of the applicable sections of the YCA.
2. See S. REP. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SEWcE 3983.
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976), infra note 11; Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S.
424 (1977).
4. The statute provides a broad range of options to the first sentencing judge, see
infra note 34 and accompanying text. However, once a youth offender is sentenced under
the YCA, the statute is silent as to modifications of that sentence, except to reduce the
sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (1976), infra note 56.
5. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d 1077, 1083 (7th Cir. 1981) (neither the
Bureau of Prisons official nor a second sentencing judge had authority to modify treat-
ment conditions of YCA sentence not yet expired, even though continued YCA treat-
ment is viewed to be of "no benefit" to the youth offender); Outing v. Bell, 632 F.2d 1144
(4th Cir. 1980) (youth offender sentenced under YCA sentence to a concurrent or consec-
utive adult term forfeits YCA status and need not be segregated from adult offenders);
Thompson v. Carlson, 624 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1980) (since second sentencing judge deter-
mined that continued YCA treatment would be of "no benefit" to the youth offender, the
1
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Robinson,6 finally resolved this dilemma, holding that a youth
offender sentenced under the YCA could have his YCA treat-
ment terminated and an adult sentence imposed, even though
the sentence under the YCA had not yet expired, when contin-
ued YCA treatment was determined to be of "no benefit" to
him.
Part II of this note sets forth the factual background of Ral-
ston, and Part III discusses the legal background of the YCA.
Part IV presents the decision of the United States Supreme
Court, and Part V analyzes the decision. This note concludes
that the Court ignored the intent of the YCA and the well-
stated common law rules in modifying the YCA treatment when
it deemed such treatment as futile. A subsequent sentence im-
posed on a youth offender for a crime he was convicted of during
his YCA treatment should not alter the original sentence he was
given.
II. Ralston v. Robinson: Factual Background s
In 1974, John Carroll Robinson, age seventeen, pleaded
guilty to a charge of second degree murder and was sentenced to
ten years imprisonment under the YCA.9 Conditions of his re-
court affirmed immediate placement of the youth offender in adult treatment).
6. 454 U.S. 201 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 929 (1982).
7. Id. at 217.
8. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts presented are taken from Justice Marshall's
opinion for the majority of the Supreme Court, 454 U.S. 201 (1981) and from Judge
Swygert's opinion for the court of appeals, Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir.
1981).
9. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 203. 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1976) provides that-
(a) If the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need com-
mitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the
youth offender on probation.
(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and the
offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law other
than this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment other-
wise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney
General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter until discharged
by the Commission as provided in section 5017(c) of this chapter; or
(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive
maximum benefit from the treatment by the Commission prior to the expiration
of six years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprison-
ment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the
Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any
[Vol. 3:375
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lease included that he receive at least an eighth grade education
and vocational training in a trade of his choice, that he undergo
weekly individual therapy, and that he receive a complete psy-
chological reevaluation.10 Because Robinson was sentenced
under the YCA, he, like all others sentenced under the YCA, was
to be kept separated from adult offenders."
In 1975, while in the Federal Correctional Institution at
Ashland, Kentucky, Robinson was found guilty of assaulting a
federal officer with a dangerous weapon.1 2 This conviction re-
sulted in a sixty-six month adult sentence to run consecutive to
the YCA sentence.1 3 This second judge did not sentence Robin-
son under the YCA because he felt it would not benefit Robin-
son to do So. 1 4 After transfers from prison to prison, Robinson
was placed in the Federal Correctional Institution in Lompoc,
further period that may be authorized by law for the offense or offenses of which
he stands convicted or until discharged by the Commission as provided in section
5017(d) of this chapter.
(d) If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from
treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the youth of-
fender under any other applicable penalty provision.
(e) If the court desires additional information as to whether a youth offender
will derive benefit from treatment under subsections (b) or (c) it may order that
he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for observation and study
at an appropriate classification center or agency. Within sixty days from the date
of the order, or such additional period as the court may grant, the Commission
shall report to the court its findings.
Id.
10. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 204.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976) provides that:
Committed youth offenders not conditionally released shall undergo treat-
ment in institutions of maximum security, medium security, or minimum security
types, including training schools, hospitals, farms, forestry and other camps, and
other agencies that will provide the essential varieties of treatment. The Director
shall from time to time designate, set aside, and adapt institutions and agencies
under the control of the Department of Justice for treatment. Insofar as practical,
such institutions and agencies shall be used only for treatment of committed
youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offend-
ers, and classes of youth offenders shall be segregated according to their needs for
treatment.
Id.
12. The Court indicated that from the time of his original incarceration, Robinson's
"subsequent conduct has not been exemplary." Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 204.
13. This particular sentence was originally an additional ten-year adult sentence,
but upon the recommendation of the Bureau of Prisons, it was reduced to a sixty-six
month adult sentence to run consecutively with the YCA sentence. Id. at 204.
14. Id.
3
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California; in 1977 he pleaded guilty to assaulting another fed-
eral officer." For this offense Robinson received a one year and
one day adult sentence to run consecutive to his prior two
sentences.16 After this second sentence as an adult offender was
imposed, the Bureau of Prisons reclassified Robinson as an adult
offender and no longer separated him from the adult prisoners.1 7
As a result of this reclassification by the Bureau of Prisons,
Robinson, after exhausting his administrative remedies, filed a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court,'8
claiming that he was entitled, under the YCA, to be separated
from the adult prisoners. 9
The district court granted the writ and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, 20 holding that the Bureau of Prisons
does not have the authority to reclassify a prisoner sentenced
under the YCA, thereby treating him as an adult for the remain-
der of his YCA sentence.2 The United States Supreme Court
reversed in Ralston v. Robinson,2 and held, by a 6-3 majority,
that the YCA permits sentencing judges great latitude in impos-
ing sentences, and a subsequent sentence can alter the original
sentence by removing the offender from YCA treatment if such
treatment will not benefit him further. 3 The court further held,
however, that the YCA does not grant authority to the Bureau
15. Id.
16. The judge in this second adult sentence made no explicit finding that Robinson
would receive no benefit from a YCA sentence even though he could still have been
sentenced under the YCA. Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d at 1078.
17. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 204-05, 205 n.2.
Robinson asserted that he had never been segregated from non-YCA prisoners nor
had he received special treatment. The Court noted, "although petitioner disputes this
assertion, the record of frequent transfers lends some credence to [Robinson's] claim."
The Court, however, did not address this issue, for it determined that such determina-
tion need not be made, given the "disposition of this case." Id.
18. The original writ was filed in the Southern District of Indiana. Petitioner was
subsequently transfered to a penitentiary in Illinois, and the case was transfered to the
Southern District of Illinois. Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d at 1078.
19. See supra note 11.
20. Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1981).
21. Id. at 1083.
22. 454 U.S. 201 (1981).
23. Id. at 217. Justice Marshall wrote for the majority. Joining him were Chief Jus-
tice Burger, Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rhenquist. Justice Powell
wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens wrote for the dissent in which Justice Bren-
nan and Justice O'Connor joined. Id. at 202.
[Vol. 3:375
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/7
1983] YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT
of Prisons to reclassify YCA offenders."
III. Ralston v. Robinson: Legal Background
The YCA was drafted and presented to Congress in 1949
and became the Federal Youth Corrections Act in 1950.11 The
purpose of the YCA is to provide treatment2 6 for convicted
youth offenders2 7 in an effort to rehabilitate such offenders with
the hope of making them productive members of society. The
United States Supreme Court, in its thorough analysis of the
YCA in Dorszynski v. United States,18 found two important fac-
tors that led to the eventual passage of the YCA:
[f]irst, the period of life between 16 and 22 years of age was found
to be the time when special factors operated to produce habitual
criminals. Second, then existing methods of treating criminally
inclined youths were found inadequate in avoiding recidivism."
The YCA is modeled after the English Borstal System, 0
which substitutes rehabilitation for retribution as the goal of
24. Id.
25. The Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005 - 5026 (1976). See Dor-
szynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432 n.8 (1977).
26. "'Treatment' means corrective and preventitive guidance and training designed
to protect the public by correcting the antisocial tendencies of youth offenders." 18
U.S.C. § 5006(f) (1976).
27. "'Youth offender' means a person under the age of twenty-two years at the time
of the conviction." Id. § 5006(d) (1976).
28. 418 U.S. 424 (1977).
29. Id. at 432-33.
30. [The Borstal System] now embraces 13 institutions. Some are walled. Others
are completely open. Each institution has its own particular specialty.
One provides complete facilities for trade training in metal and woodwork. An-
other is laid out and run as a summer camp with work and recreational programs
which keep the boys out of doors. A third is largely devoted to agriculture and
stock raising. One institution graduates skilled workers in the building trades.
While the institutions differ in many respects, the have certain things in com-
mon .... [An) individual plan based on close acquaintance with individual needs
and antecedents and calculated to return the young men to society as social and
rehabilitated citizens.
... Three cardinal principles dominate the system:
(1) flexibility, (2) individualization, and (3) emphasis on the intangibles.
H.R. RaP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5 (1950); (1950) U.S. CODE CONG. SRVICE
3983, 3987.
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sentencing.3l In Durst v. United States,3 2 the United States Su-
preme Court found that:
Both the Borstal System and the YCA incorporate three features
thought essential to the operation of a successful rehabilitation
treatment program: flexibility in choosing among a variety of
treatment settings and programs tailored to individual needs; sep-
aration of youth offenders from hardened criminals; and careful
and flexible control of the duration of commitment and of super-
vised release." 
The YCA is designed to grant the sentencing judge a wider
range of sentencing options. 4 "The purpose of the . . . legisla-
tion is to provide a new alternative sentencing and treatment
procedure for [youth offenders]." 35  If, in the opinion of the
judge,3 6 the youth offender will not be benefited, he can be sen-
tenced as an adult even though he is under 22 years of age.3
Benefits derived from YCA sentencing include separation from
hardened criminals and a youth rehabilitation program. 8 The
discretion granted to the trial judge in deciding whether or not
to sentence under the YCA is the same discretion that is tradi-
31. Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 545 (1978).
32. 434 U.S. 542 (1978).
33. Id. at 545-46.
34. The sentencing judge may, under the YCA, impose probation, 18 U.S.C. §
5010(a) (1976); a YCA indeterminate sentence of up to six years (a maximum of four
years incarceration and a maximum of two years parole), notwithstanding that the maxi-
mum adult sentence for the same offense would be less than six years, Id. at § 5010(b)
(1976); a YCA indeterminate sentence limited by the appropriate adult sentence when
the adult sentence is over six years (a maximum incarceration of two years less than the
term of the adult sentence, and a maximum parole of two years), Id. at §§ 5010(c),
5010(d); and any other applicable penalty such as fines, restitution, or an adult sentence.
See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 436 (1977). Accord Mustain v. Pearson,
592 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Oliver, 546 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
35. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 437 (1977) (quoting S. REP. No. 1180,
81st Cong., 1st Seas. 1 (1949) (emphasis is the Court's)).
36. The sentencing judge is given wide discretion to impose sentences under 18
U.S.C. § 5010. See supra note 9. Further, the sentencing judge can gather additional
information as to whether the youth will benefit from the YCA treatment through the
power given to the judge under § 5010(e) to order observation and study of the youth.
See supra note 9.
37. The sentencing judge must expressly find that the youth offender will receive no
benefit from YCA treatment to impose an adult sentence on a youth offender eligible for
YCA treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976). See supra note 9.
38. See supra note 11.
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tionally granted to a trial judge in imposing any sentence.3 9
In using his discretion, the trial judge need not explicitly
state his reasons for finding "no benefit" to the youth offender if
the record establishes that the judge had fully considered
whether the defendant would receive a benefit from sentencing
under the YCA.40 If, however, as in United States v. Ingram,41
where the trial judge determined that he would not sentence
under the YCA because of the crime committed by the youth
offender 42 and he did not consider the individual interests of the
youth offender, the discretion of the judge may be challenged in
the appeals court.43 The Congressional intent of the YCA was to
sentence according to the interests (benefit) of the individual,"
and that is the sole question to be addressed in assessing
whether to sentence under the YCA or to sentence as an adult.
If the judge considers the interests of and possible benefits to
the individual, the judge need not state specific reasons why he
does or does not sentence under the YCA.45 For instance, a trial
judge may find that it is of no benefit to sentence under the
YCA if the youth offender has a past history of crime."'
In sum, the YCA provides for many benefits that the youth
offender can receive from sentencing under its provisions. The
purpose of the YCA is to prevent youth offenders from becoming
hardened criminals. If the trial judge, using his best discretion,
determines that separating the youth offender from hardened
criminals and giving him the proper rehabilitative treatment will
benefit the youth offender and help protect him from becoming
a hardened criminal, then he should be sentenced under the
YCA.
39. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1977).
40. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. at 425-26.
41. 530 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1976).
42. The defendant had been convicted of armed bank robbery and the judge deter-
mined that armed bank robbers would derive no benefit from a YCA sentence. Id. at 603.
43. Cf. United States v. Allen, 510 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
44. United States v. Ingram, 530 F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1976).
45. Dorzynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1977). See also United States v.
Blankenship, 548 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 978 (1976).
46. United States v. Butler, 481 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The youth offender not
only had a past history of crime, but also showed no remorse for murder. Id. at 537.
19831
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IV. The Holding of the Court
A. The Majority and Concurring Opinions
The United States Supreme Court held that the second sen-
tencing judge had the discretion to find that Robinson would no
longer benefit from continuing the YCA treatment for the re-
mainder of his YCA sentence.' Therefore, it was solely within
the judge's authority to have Robinson removed from the YCA
treatment and have him placed with the adult prisoners." In
reaching this holding, the Court reiterated the history of the
YCA,'49 determining that its purpose is to "[f]irst . . .strongly
[endorse] the discretionary power of a judge to choose among
available sentencing options [and] [s]econd, . . . [prescribe] cer-
tain basic conditions of treatment for YCA offenders." 50
The Court next looked to the language of the YCA, particu-
larly sections 5010 and 5011, to determine if the Bureau of Pris-
ons has the authority to reclassify a YCA offender and remove
him from treatment. The Court noted that prison officials retain
a "significant degree of discretionary authority . . ." in dealing
with YCA offenders." The discretionary authority of the Bureau
of Prisons was deemed to include the power to determine the
needs of YCA offenders, 2 to confine and treat them in a manner
47. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 214-17.
48. Id. at 215.
49. Id. at 206-10.
50. Id. at 206.
51. Id. at 211. The Court noted, however, that the YCA allocated "responsibility for
determining essential treatment conditions in an unusual way," stating:
Under traditional sentencing statutes, prison officials exercise almost unlimited
discretion in imposing the security and treatment conditions that they believe ap-
propriate. The YCA is different. By determining that the youth offender should be
sentenced under the YCA, the trial court in effect decides two essential conditions
of confinement: The Bureau of Prisons must comply with both the segregation
and treatment requirements of the YCA .... The Bureau retains significant dis-
cretion in determining the conditions of confinement ... but its discretion is lim-
ited by these requirements.
Id. at 208-09 (citations omitted).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 5014 (1976) provides that:
The Director shall provide classification centers and agencies. Every commit-
ted youth offender shall first be sent to a classification center or agency. The clas-
sification center or agency shall make a complete study of each committed youth
offender, including a mental and phsycial examination, to ascertain his personal
traits, his capabilities, pertinent circumstances of his school, family life, any previ-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/7
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which best protects the public," to transfer them to appropriate
agencies," to decide the appropriate setting for treatment," and
to make recommendations for their release." The Court con-
ous delinquency or criminal experience, and any mental or physical defect or other
factor contributing to his delinquency. In the absence of exceptional circumstance,
such study shall be completed within a period of thirty days. The agency shall
promptly forward to the Director and to the Commission a report of its findings
with respect to the youth offender and its recommendations as to his treatment.
As soon as practicable after commitment, the youth offender shall receive a parole
interview.
Id.
53. 18 U.S.C § 5015 (1976) provides that:
(a) On receipt of the report and recommendations from the classification
agency the Director may-
(1) recommend to the Commission that the committed youth offender be released
conditionally under supervision; or
(2) allocate and direct the transfer of the committed youth offender to an agency
or institution for treatment; or
(3) order the committed youth offender confined and afforded treatment under
such conditions as he believes best designed for the protection of the public.
(b) The Director may transfer at any time a youth offender from one agency
or institution to any other agency or institution.
Id.
54. Id. See supra note 53.
55. Id. See supra note 11.
56. Id. §§ 5014, 5015(a)(1), 5016, 5017. See supra notes 52, 53 for the text of sec-
tions 5014 and 5015 respectively. 18 U.S.C. § 5016 (1976) provides that:
The Director shall cause periodic examinations and reexaminations to be made of
all committed youth offenders and shall report to the Commission as to each such
offender as the Commission may require. United States probation officers and su-
pervisory agents shall likewise report to the Commission respecting youth offend-
ers under their supervision as the Commission may direct.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 5017 (1976) provides that:
(a) The Commission may at any time after reasonable notice to the Director
release conditionally under supervision a committed youth offender in accordance
with the provisions of section 4206 of this title. When, in the judgment of the
Director, a committed youth offender shall be released conditionally under super-
vision he shall so report and recommend to the Commission.
(b) The Commission may discharge a committed youth offender uncondition-
ally at the expiration of one year from the date of conditional release.
(c) A youth offender committed under section 5010(b) of this chapter shall be
released conditionally under supervision on or before the expiration of four years
from the date of his conviction and shall be discharged unconditionally on or
before six years from the date of his conviction.
(d) A youth offender committed under section 5010(c) of this chapter shall be
released conditionally under supervision not later than two years before the expi-
ration of the term imposed by the court. He may be discharged unconditionally at
the expiration of not less than one year from the date of his conditional release.
9
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cluded that the YCA granted the Bureau of Prisons absolutely
no authority to reclassify YCA offenders, despite the otherwise
broad discretion granted by the specific provisions of the YCA.5 7
Finally, the Court attempted to harmonize the purpose of
the YCA with the express provisions of the Act. 8 The Court did
this by using a three step process. First, the Court noted that
there is no explicit section of the YCA dealing with the judge's
discretion on resentencing." Second, the Court looked at the
"no benefit" language in section 5010(d). 0 Third, the Court ex-
amined the legislative history and found that Congress did not
discuss the specific problem of a youth offender who subse-
quently committed a crime while serving the original sentence.61
Unable to draw a conclusion from this, the Court delved further
and found that Congress had spoken of the possibility of a YCA
sentence failings2 by providing for longer sentences under sec-
tion 5010(c).6 s The Court also pointed to section 5023, which
He shall be discharged unconditionally on or before the expiration of the maxi-
mum sentence imposed, computed uninterruptedly from the date of conviction.
(e) Commutation of sentence authorized by any Act of Congress shall not be
granted as a matter of right to committed youth offenders but only in accordance
with rules prescribed by the Director with the approval of the Commission.
Id.
57. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 211-12. The Court stated:
[T]he statute does not give the Bureau any discretion to modify the basic terms of
treatment that a judge imposes under §§ 5010 and 5011. When a judge imposes a
youth sentence under the YCA, it commits the youth to the custody of the Attor-
ney General 'for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter' 18 U.S.C. §
5010(b) and (c). Section 5011 provides two elements of mandatory treatment: first,
youths must undergo treatment in an appropriate institution that will 'provide the
essential varieties of treatment'; second '[i]nsofar as practical, such institutions
and agencies shall be used only for treatment of youth offenders, and such offend-
ers shall be segregated from other offenders, and classes of committed youth of-
fenders shall be segregated according to their needs for treatment.' These two ele-
ments of the program are statutorily mandated, and the discretion of the Bureau
is limited to the flexible discharge of its responsibilities within these two broad
constraints.
Id. at 211-12 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 213-15.
59. Id. at 213.
60. Id. at 213-14. If the youth offender will receive "no benefit" from sentencing
under the YCA the courts can look to any other sentence that will apply under the law.
See 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976), supra note 9.
61. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 214 (1981).
62. Id. at 214-15.
63. See supra notes 9 & 34.
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permits the Court to reevaluate the original sentence by reduc-
ing it to probation," and section 502165 which permits a court to
unconditionally release a youth offender on probation, but
reserves to the court a right to sentence as an adult if the youth
offender commits a crime while on probation. 6
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, would not limit
the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons in the fashion the major-
ity did.67 He reasoned that after the initial YCA sentence, two
courts convicted Robinson for two different acts of assaulting a
federal officer and both courts had sentenced Robinson to con-
secutive adult sentences. This evidenced his "incorrigibility and
capacity for violence" and as a result, his treatment as an adult
was warranted.68 Justice Powell looked to the broad discretion
vested in the Bureau of Prisons69 and determined that the Bu-
reau of Prisons "had the authority - indeed the duty - to
64. 18 U.S.C. § 5023(a), (b) (1976) provides that:
(a) Nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the power of any court to
suspend the imposition or execution of any sentence and place a youth offender on
probation or be construed in any wise to amend, repeal, or affect the provisions of
chapter 231 of this title or the Act of June 25, 1910 (ch.433, 36 Stat. 864), as
amended (ch. 1, title 24, of the D. of C. Code), both relative to probation.
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed in any wise to amend, repeal,
or affect the provisions of chapter 403 of this title (the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act), or limit the jurisdiction of the United States courts in the adminis-
tration or enforcement of that chapter except that the powers as to parole of juve-
nile delinquents shall be exercised by the Division.
Id.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1976) provides that:
(a) Upon the unconditional discharge by the Commission of a committed
youth offender before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed on him,
the conviction shall be automatically set aside and the Commission shall issue to
the youth offender a certificate to that effect.
(b) Where the youth offender has been placed on probation by the court, the
court may thereafter, in its discretion, unconditionally discharge such youth of-
fender from probation prior to expiration of the maximum period of probation
theretofore fixed by the court, which discharge shall automatically set aside the
conviction, and the court shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that
effect.
Id.
66. The Court reasoned that if this could happen to a youth offender while on pro-
bation, it could also be applied to him while he is still confined. Ralston v. Robinson, 454
U.S. at 217.
67. Id. at 221 (Powell, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 222 (Powell, J., concurring).
69. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
1983]
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
transfer [Robinson] from the Federal Youth Center to a 'facility
providing greater security.' ",70
B. The Dissent
The dissent agreed in purpose with the majority that "futile
YCA treatment [need not] be continued," and that Congress did
not intend YCA treatment to be continued when a youth of-
fender demonstrates that such treatment would be of no benefit
to him.7 ' The dissent also agreed that the Bureau of Prisons is
not authorized to amend the youth offender's classification.72
The dissent, however, disagreed with the majority's holding that
Robinson could be removed from the YCA treatment and be
treated as an adult offender when the YCA sentence was not yet
expired nor had it been terminateds.7  The dissent argued that
there are only two ways the YCA treatment could be converted
into an adult sentence: First, if the second sentencing judge im-
posed a concurrent sentence that would take effect immediately,
the YCA treatment would be terminated and the adult sentence
followed.' 4 Second, if the second sentencing judge imposed a
consecutive adult sentence, it is within the discretion of the Bu-
reau of Prisons to "terminate the YCA confinement and allow
the consecutive adult sentence to commence. '7' To merely
change the treatment of Robinson from the YCA to that of an
adult offender, without terminating the original sentence, was
inconsistent with the Congressional intent in promulgating the
YCA, for less drastic solutions existed to properly treat this
problem. 76
The dissent further found the majority's holding to be viola-
tive of the common law rule that once a sentence is imposed and
the defendant starts to serve it, that sentence cannot be in-
70. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., concurring).
71. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 226-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
was joined in his dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor.
72. Id. at 225-26 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 227 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (1976)). See supra note 56 for the text of section
5017.
76. Id. The dissent, as previously noted, explained two less drastic solutions to this
problem. See supra text accompanying notes 74, 75.
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creased." The dissent reasoned that imposing adult treatment
for the remainder of Robinson's unexpired YCA term violated a
"well-settled rule prohibiting judges from increasing the severity
of a sentence once it has become final. '78 The dissent also noted
that the typical YCA sentence is "qualitatively less severe than
an adult sentence of equal length, 7 9 yet may be longer than the
adult sentence for the same infraction."0 The YCA treatment,
stressing rehabilitation with broad authority for prison officials
to order early releases of youth offenders,8' has been referred to
as the quid pro quo for the longer confinement under different
circumstances. 82 According to the dissent, to permit "a second
sentencing judge to convert an unexpired YCA sentence into an
adult sentence, the quid pro quo vanishes. 83 The dissent fur-
ther noted that following the majority's holding, the defendant
"may end up. . . serving [a] lengthier sentence under the adult
conditions he paid a price to avoid,"8' without the benefits ac-
77. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent ex-
plained the common law rule as follows:
"As a general practice, the sentence, when imposed by a court of record, is within
the power of the court during the session in which it is entered, and may be
amended at any time during such session, provided a punishment already partly
suffered be not increased." F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 913,
at 641 (9th ed. 1889) (emphasis added) (quoted in United States v. Benz, 282 U.S.
304, 307).
Id. at 223 n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
As Chief Justice Burger wrote when he was a Circuit Judge of the court of appeals,
"confinement [under the YCA] can not be equated with incarceration in an ordinary
prison." Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See United States v.
McDonald, 611 F.2d 1291, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. United States, 326 F. 2d 56,
57 (10th Cir. 1963).
80. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The YCA sentence
may be up to six years even though the adult sentence would be less for the same infrac-
tion. See 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1976), supra note 9.
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1976), supra note 9, and 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (1976), supra
note 56.
82. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J.).
Accord Abernathy v. United States, 418 F.2d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. United
States, 374 F.2d 966, 967 (4th Cir. 1967); Brisco v. United States, 368 F.2d 214, 215 (3d
Cir. 1966); Kotz v. United States, 353 F.2d 312, 314 (8th Cir. 1965); Eller v. United
States, 327 F.2d 639, 639 (9th Cir. 1964); Rogers v. United States, 326 F.2d 56, 56-57
(10th Cir. 1963).
83. Robinson v. Ralston, 454 U.S. at 232 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cruing to an adult offender, such as "good-time allowances," for
the duration of the YCA sentence. 5
V. Analysis of the Decision
The Court used a back door approach to decide the issue of
whether a second sentencing judge can change a youth offender
from YCA treatment to adult treatment. Finding no explicit sec-
tion in the YCA s and no specific legislative history, 7 the Court
expands the YCA by considering what Congress did not say.
The general purpose of the YCA is to provide sentencing
judges broader alternatives in sentencing youth offenders, to re-
habilitate them to avoid recidivism, and to keep them separate
from adult offenders.8 Congress intended the sentencing court
to find the needs of the youth offender to be of paramount im-
portance" in fulfilling this purpose. By removing the person
from the YCA treatment the youth offender's needs are no
longer being attended to, and thus the intent of Congress is be-
ing thwarted.' 0 The original sentencing judge made a determina-
tion that the youth offender will receive benefit from the YCA
treatment and that determination should not be circumvented
by a subsequent sentencing judge.
The original YCA sentence is a determination made by the
sentencing judge at trial court level to both segregate the youth
offender and to give him special treatment.' 1 To permit a second
sentencing judge, also at the trial court level, to assess a differ-
ent sentence would be, in effect, to grant the second sentencing
judge an appellate review of the first sentencing judge.2 The
85. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Staudmier v. United States, 496 F.2d 1191, 1192
(10th Cir. 1974); Hale v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 345, 346 (W.D. Okla. 1970); Foote v.
United States, 306 F. Supp. 627, 628-29 (D. Nev. 1969).
86. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 213.
87. Id. at 214.
88. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010, 5011 (1976) supra notes 9 & 11. See Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1977).
89. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 434 (1977), where the Court
stated: "[an important element of the program was that once a person was committed
for treatment under the Act, the execution of sentence was to fit the person, not the
crime for which he was convicted." Id.
90. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976), supra note 11.
92. The district courts of the United States generally have no appellate authority.
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Court's decision seems to be based not on the statute or on the
legislative history of the YCA, but on Robinson's acts subse-
quent to his YCA sentencing. 3
The Court considered further YCA treatment for Robinson
to be an exercise in futility as a result of his subsequent convic-
tions for serious crimes, and concluded that the Congressional
intent of the YCA would not be hampered by placing Robinson
in adult treatment." The reasoning behind this stems from the
'no benefit' language in the YCA.9 5 The Court noted that in ap-
plying a sentence for a crime committed subsequent to a YCA
sentence, the judge should determine if the youth offender will
derive any further benefit from YCA treatment.9 In doing this,
the second sentencing judge will have to use the same standards
as the judge that imposed the original YCA sentence.9 7 In decid-
ing this second sentence, however, the judge will have the second
conviction to consider in addition to all the factors the original
judge had to consider. This would make it more likely that the
stiffer adult imprisonment would result from the second
conviction.9
An exception to this rule is an appeal from the judgment of a magistrate as provided in
18 U.S.C. § 3402 (1976).
93. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
94. The Court states: "In conclusion, we are convinced that Congress did not intend
that a person who commits serious crimes while serving a YCA sentence should automat-
ically receive treatment that has proven futile." Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 220.
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976), supra note 9.
96. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 218-19.
97. Id. at 218.
98. The Court stresses the importance of the subsequent conviction by stating, "[o]f
course, the judge should consider the fact that the offender has been convicted of an-
other crime." Id. (emphasis added). To the Court, the defendant's subsequent actions
triggered "the condition that permits appropriate modification of the terms of confine-
ment," Id. at 220 n. 14. The Court disposes of any double jeopardy implications due to
the modification of Robinson's treatment by tersely stating, "[aifter all, the imposition of
confinement when an offender violates his term of probation has never been considered
to raise a serious double jeopardy problem." Id. at 220 n. 14 (citing United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980)). The Court ignored, however, an important dis-
tinction in their cursory inspection of the double jeopardy issue. Robinson was convicted
of two subsequent crimes, and he was sentenced for each crime. He was not a violator of
probation, but rather, in Justice Powell's words, an "incorrigible youth" who was receiv-
ing YCA treatment. Id. at 222 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court, in their haste to ter-
minate the "futile" special treatment for Robinson, and to impose harsher adult treat-
ment, does not require the YCA term to first expire, or be terminated before placing
Robinson in an adult treatment facility. This shortcut, in effect, permits the Court to
15
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This procedure seems unduly harsh on the youth offender.
The YCA treatment is not expected to work overnight, and thus
provision is made for the treatment to last over a period of sev-
eral years.99 Robinson was placed in the program for ten years.
His first subsequent conviction occured one year after his origi-
nal sentence began. The second conviction occured two years af-
ter that. From this record one might picture Robinson as incor-
rigible, as did Justice Powell in his concurrence"'0 however,
[I]t may be that a youth who goes through a period of treatment
in a youth correction center would be less susceptible to the influ-
ences of hardened criminals during his subsequent confinement
than one who was not so treated. This might also be so if one
accepts the motivating assumption, which was central to the en-
actment of the statute, that an offender is more susceptible to
corrective treatment and rehabilitation as a 'youth' than in later
years. ' o
From this naturally flows the assumption that if the youth
offender is better rehabilitated by segregation from hardened
criminals, then the converse is also true: to place him with hard-
ened criminals while still a youth will tend to encourage recidi-
vism. Therefore, to remove him from YCA treatment in the
third year of a ten year term would not give the youthful of-
fender the opportunity to rehabilitate himself as envisioned by
the original sentencing judge in prescribing the YCA sentence.
In lieu of reclassifying Robinson as an adult offender, it would
have been to his benefit to place him in a maximum security
institution for youth offenders. 10 2 The YCA provides not only
impose harsher treatment on Robinson while still maintaining the original sentence term
of the YCA. As noted by the dissent, to impose adult treatment for the remainder of the
YCA term may punish the defendant for a longer time than he would have originally
received had the YCA treatment not been imposed. See supra notes 84, 85 and accompa-
nying text. The majority viewed this problem as not a valid double jeopardy problem, for
Robinson, by his own actions, proved himself deserving of the ensuing harsher treat-
ment. Thus, according to the majority's logic, Robinson is merely getting what he de-
serves, and any hope for rehabilitation is completely abandoned.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1976), supra note 9.
100. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 222 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
101. Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d 1077, 1082 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Thompson v.
Carlson, 624 F.2d 415, 428 (3rd Cir. 1980) (Adams, J., dissenting) (citing Dorszynski v.
United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1977)).
102. The Court noted that a "hardened" youth offender may present a serious prob-
lem to an institution administering YCA treatment. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 212
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that youth offenders be segregated from adult offenders, but
that the Bureau of Prisons classify the youth offenders into a
need for maximum security, medium security and minimum se-
curity.103 Since the second sentencing judge imposed a consecu-
tive adult sentence on Robinson, the Bureau of Prisons could
have placed Robinson in a maximum security institution for
youth offenders. Such placement would have preserved the de-
termination of the original sentencing judge that the YCA treat-
ment would benefit Robinson; segregating him from the adult
offenders would better comply with the legislative intent of the
YCA.104
The Court looked to the language of Dorszynski v. United
States10 5 to support its conclusion. That language states that the
overriding legislative purpose of the YCA is that "once a person
[is] committed for treatment under the Act, the execution of the
sentence [is] to fit the person, not the crime."1" The quoted lan-
guage, however, dealt with the Bureau of Prisons' determination
of how the youth offender was to be treated within the YCA, not
to remove him from YCA treatment.10 7 Robinson was placed
n.5. The petitioning warden argued that "because some 'hardened' youths may be serv-
ing YCA sentences, it is 'impractical' to segregate them from adults." Id. The Court
completely deferred to the sentencing judge's ruling in this matter, stating, "[t]he sen-
tencing courts, however, determined that these 'hardened' youths would benefit from
YCA treatment and consequently should be segregated from adults and integrated with
other youth offenders. Petitioner really questions the wisdom, not the practicality, of
that determination." Id. Thus, the Court appears willing to uphold, as inviolate, the orig-
inal sentencing judge's determination that YCA treatment will benefit a youth offender
yet, where a youth offender commits an additional infraction requiring an additional
sentence, the Court defers to the second sentencing judge's decision to terminate the
YCA treatment when he sees it of "no benefit" to the youth, despite the original sentenc-
ing judge's opinion to the contrary.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976), supra note 11.
104. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
105. 418 U.S. 424 (1977).
106. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 220 (quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418
U.S. 424, 434 (1977)).
107. The Court in Dorszynski said:
An important element of the program was that once a person was committed
for treatment under the Act, the execution of sentence was to fit the person, not
the crime for which he was convicted. Classification agencies were to be estab-
lished by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to receive and study the person
committed and to make recommendations to the Director as to the appropriate
treatment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5014, 5015. Further, the range of treatment available was
made broad to provide maximum flexibility. The Director was authorized both to
19831
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under YCA treatment for the act of murder in the second de-
gree. He was taken off the treatment for the act of assaulting a
federal officer. His YCA treatment was terminated in a different
proceeding on an entirely different matter than for which it was
imposed. It had nothing to do with the original murder, and the
subsequent sentence should have nothing to do with the murder
sentence.
The YCA has only one provision for modifying a sentence,
and that provision serves only to reduce a previously imposed
sentence."'8 Such reduction of a sentence pursuant to this provi-
sion would be in the form of releasing the youth conditionally on
probation. 0 ' The Court reasoned that if the youth offender com-
mits a crime while on probation, he could be sentenced as an
adult for the crime he commits. 10 In an event such as this, how-
ever, the YCA treatment sentence would end when the subse-
quent adult sentence is imposed."'
The Court never addressed Robinson's allegations that he
was never segregated from non-YCA offenders and that he never
received YCA treatment. 1 2 If this is true, and the Court noted
that the multiple transfers of Robinson "lend credence" to this
allegation," 3 then Robinson could not have received the benefit
the original sentencing judge meant him to have. Under these
circumstances he was not given the opportunity to rehabilitate
himself in the fashion Congress intended in promulgating the
YCA. The Court did not address this issue because of its dispo-
sition in the case," 4 but it should have been examined to deter-
mine if the program is following the true intent of Congress.
adapt numerous public facilities, and to contract with public or private agencies,
in order to provide institutional treatment which the Director could vary accord-
ing to the committed person's progress or lack of it. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5011, 5015. An
integral part of the treatment program was the segregation of committed persons,
insofar as practicable, so as to place them with those similarly committed, to avoid
the influence of association with the more hardened inmates serving traditional
criminal sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 5011.
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 434 (1977).
108. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5021, 5023 (1976), supra notes 65 and 64.
109. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 215 n.7.
110. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
111. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. at 215-16.
112. Id. at 205 n.2. See supra note 17.
113. Id.
114. Id.
[Vol. 3:375
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/7
YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT
The Court should have permitted Robinson's YCA treat-
ment to continue in accordance with his original sentence. After
the term of the YCA sentence he would be reclassified an adult
offender and would be required to serve the two consecutive
adult sentences subsequently imposed on him for his convictions
while serving as a youth offender under the YCA. Nowhere in
the language of the YCA is a judge given the authority to reclas-
sify a youth offender, and there is no legislative history evidenc-
ing this reclassification to be within the intent of Congress. As
Judge Pell wrote in his concurring opinion in this case in the
court of appeals: "[w]hile I see, on this record, no indication to
think that either Robinson or society will benefit by continuing
the YCA treatment, Congress, by the statute applicable in this
case, has mandated [its] continuance.1 1 5
VI. Conclusion
The Court determined that continued YCA treatment for
Robinson would be "futile" for Robinson had demonstrated that
the treatment had little rehabilitative effect. Starting from this
premise, the Court hypothesized that Congress never intended
such treatment to be an exercise in futility, and thus the Court
modified Robinson's treatment to that of an adult, notwith-
standing the absence of statutory authority or legislative intent
to do so. Thus, the Court deemed Robinson to be an incorrigible
youth, and punished him as an adult for the crimes he commit-
ted, both for the remainder of the term of his YCA sentence and
for the subsequent convictions imposed upon him while in con-
finement under the YCA. As the dissent properly noted, such
modification can lead to longer punishment than if the adult
sentence was originally imposed. The impact of this decision
may be limited to modifications of sentences under the YCA,
but with the Court so willing to interpret what Congress did not
say and so eager to achieve a certain result, one must wonder to
what limits the Court will go in future sentencing decisions.
Robert J. Camera
115. Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d at 1083 (Pell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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